Online Appendix

to "Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout?
Evidence from over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies"

published in *Political Studies*

A.1 Dataset

Country	Elections
Austria	1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013
Belgium	1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014
Bulgaria	1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014
Croatia	2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2016
Cyprus	1976, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016
Czech Republic	1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013
Denmark	1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
Estonia	1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
Finland	1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
France	1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012
Germany	1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013
Greece	1974, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2012, 2015, 2015
Hungary	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Iceland	1971, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2016
Ireland	1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016
Italy	1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013
Latvia	1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011, 2014
Lithuania	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
Luxembourg	1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013
Malta	1971, 1976, 1981, 1987, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Netherlands	1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012
Norway	1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013
Poland	1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
Portugal	1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015
Romania	1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012
Slovakia	1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2016
Slovenia	1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014
Spain	1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016
Sweden	1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
Switzerland	1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
United Kingdom	1970, 1974, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015

Table A.1: Countries and national elections included in our sample

Country	Party	Family	Election Years
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Right-wing	**2006, 2008, 2013**
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	Right-wing	1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, **1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013**
Austria	Team Stronach	Liberal	**2013**
Belgium	Flemish Block	Right-wing	**1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014**
Belgium	List Dedecker — Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	Liberal	**2007, 2010**
Belgium	National Front	Right-wing	**1995, 1999, 2003, 2007**
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium	Communist/ Socialist	**2010, 2014**
Bulgaria	Attack	Right-wing	**2005, 2009, 2013, 2014**
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Business Bloc	Liberal	**1991, 1994, 1997**
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	Conservative	**2009, 2013, 2014**
Bulgaria	National Movement Simeon II	Liberal	**2001**, 2005, 2009
Bulgaria	Order, Lawfulness and Justice	Right-wing	**2009, 2013**
Croatia	Croatian Labourists – Labour Party	Communist/ Socialist	**2011**
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights	Right-wing	**2000, 2003, 2007, 2011**
Czech Republic	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens	Liberal	**2013**
Czech Republic	Dawn of Direct Democracy	Conservative	**2013**
Czech Republic	Public Affairs	Liberal	**2010**
Czech Republic	Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	Right-wing	**1992, 1996, 1998**
Denmark	Danish Peoples Party	Right-wing	**1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015**
Denmark	Progress Party	Liberal	**1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998**
Finland	Finnish Rural Party / True Finns	Agrarian	**1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015**
France	French Communist Party	Communist/ Socialist	**1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012**
France	National Front	Right-wing	**1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012**
France	Workers' Struggle	Communist/ Socialist	**1978, 2002**
Germany	Alternative for Germany	Right-wing	**2013**

Country	Party	Family	Election Years
Germany	The Left / PDS	Communist/ Socialist	**1990**, **1994**, **1998**, **2002**, **2005**, **2009**, **2013**
Germany	The Republicans	Right-wing	**1990**, **1994**, **1998**
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	Communist/ Socialist	**2004**, **2007**, **2009**, **2012**, **2012**, **2015**, **2015**
Greece	Independent Greeks	Right-wing	**2012**, **2012**, **2015**, **2015**
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	Social democracy	**1974**, **1977**, **1981**, **1985**, **1989**, **1989**, **1990**, **1993**, **1996**, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2012, 2015, 2015
Greece	Peoples Association – Golden Dawn	Right-wing	**2012**, **2012**, **2015**, **2015**
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	Right-wing	**2004**, **2007**, **2009**, **2012**, **2012**, **2015**
Hungary	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party / Christian Democratic People's Party	Conservative	**2006**, **2010**, **2014**
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	Right-wing	**1994**, **1998**, **2002**, **2006**
Hungary	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	Right-wing	**2010**, **2014**
Iceland	Civic Movement – The Movement	Liberal	**2009**
Italy	Five Star Movement	Green/Ecologist	**2013**
Italy	Go Italy – The People of Freedom	Conservative	**2006**, **2008**, **2013**
Italy	North League	Right-wing	**1992**, **1996**, **2006**, **2008**, **2013**
Latvia	All For Latvia!	Conservative	**2006**
Lithuania	Labour Party	Liberal	**2004**, **2008**, 2012, 2016
Lithuania	Lithuanian Democratic Party	Liberal	**1996**
Lithuania	Order and Justice – Liberal Democratic Party	Conservative	**2004**, **2008**, **2012**, **2016**
Luxembourg	Action Committee Pensions — Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Conservative	**1989**, **1994**, **1999**, **2004**, **2009**, **2013**
Netherlands	Fortuyn List	Right-wing	**2002**, **2003**
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	Conservative	**2006**, **2010**, **2012**
Netherlands	Socialist Party	Communist/ Socialist	**1994**, **1998**, **2002**, **2003**, **2006**, **2010**, **2012**
Norway	Progress Party	Right-wing	**1973**, **1977**, **1981**, **1985**, **1989**, **1993**, **1997**, **2001**, **2005**, **2009**, **2013**
Poland	Law and Justice	Conservative	2001, **2005**, **2007**, **2011**, **2015**
Poland	League of Polish Families	Conservative	**2001**, **2005**, **2007**
Poland	Real Politics Union — Congress of the New Right	Conservative	**1991**, **1993**, **1997**, **2005**, **2011**
Poland	Self-Defense of the Republic Poland	Agrarian	**1993**, **2001**, **2005**, **2007**

Country	Party	Family	Election Years
Romania	Greater Romania Party	Right-wing	**1992**, **1996**, **2000**, **2004**, **2008**, **2012**
Romania	People's Party – Dan Diaconescu	Communist/ Socialist	**2012**
Romania	Social Democratic Party	Social democracy	**1992**, **1996**, **2000**, 2004, 2008, 2012
Romania	Socialist Party of Labour	Communist/ Socialist	**1992**, **1996**
Slovakia	Association of Workers of Slovakia	Communist/ Socialist	**1994**, **1998**
Slovakia	Direction – Social Democracy	Social democracy	**2002**, **2006**, 2010, 2012, 2016
Slovakia	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	Conservative	**1992**, **1994**, **1998**, **2002**, **2006**, **2010**
Slovakia	Ordinary People and Independent	Conservative	**2012**, **2016**
Slovakia	Party of Civic Understanding	Social democracy	**1998**
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	Right-wing	**1990**, **1992**, **1994**, **1998**, **2002**, **2006**, **2010**, **2012**, **2016**
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	to be coded	**1992**, **1996**, **2000**, **2004**, **2008**, **2011**, **2014**
Spain	We Can	Communist/ Socialist	**2015**, **2016**
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Right-wing	**2002**, **2006**, **2010**, **2014**
Switzerland	Automobile Party — Freedom Party of Switzerland	Right-wing	**1987**, **1991**, **1995**
Switzerland	National Action – Swiss Democrats	Right-wing	**1971**, **1975**, **1979**, **1983**, **1987**, **1991**, **1995**, **1999**
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	Agrarian	1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, **1995**, **1999**, **2003**, **2007**, **2011**, 2015
United Kingdom	British National Party	Right-wing	**2010**
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	Right-wing	**2001**, **2005**, **2010**, **2015**

Table A.2: Overview of parties coded as populist for at least one election; sorted by country and then alphabetically by party name. Election years in which parties were populist are bolded. (Coding based on Van Kessel 2015; Mudde 2007; Betz 1994; Lewandowsky et al. 2016; March and Mudde 2005; March 2011; Ramiro and Gomez 2016; Kioupkiolis 2016)

A.2 Turnout and Populism

Figure A.1: Turnout and populist vote share in national parliamentary elections, 1970 – 2016

	(1)
Year	-0.34**
	(0.0529)
R^2	0.375
N	337

Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Fixed-effects regression model regressing turnout on time including country fixed-effects

A.3   Range of predictions

Model	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
(1)	307	74.88	7.61	52.37	92.76
(2)	303	74.85	9.05	46.87	92.92
(3)	307	74.89	7.90	50.52	92.09
(4)	303	74.85	8.55	48.79	93.03
(5)	303	74.85	8.57	48.84	93.04

Table A.4: Range of predictions generated from models presented in Table 1

A.4 Table 1 and Figure 1

A.4.1 First differences, period fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.18				
	(1.54)				
Δ Populist Representation		1.81			
		$(0.98)^+$			
Δ New Populist Party			0.33		
			(0.81)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				-0.01	
				(0.04)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					-0.01
					(0.04)
Δ ENPP	-0.49	-0.56	-0.61	-0.54	-0.54
	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Δ Unemployment	0.09	0.17	0.10	0.16	0.16
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	-0.09	-0.13	-0.16	-0.14	-0.14
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-0.32	0.75	-0.98	-0.63	-0.63
	(3.29)	(3.93)	(3.42)	(3.43)	(3.43)
Δ PR	8.35	9.04	8.47	8.30	8.20
	$(4.80)^+$	$(4.56)^+$	(5.15)	$(4.70)^+$	$(4.59)^+$
Δ log(District Magnitude)	-1.25	-1.58	-1.56	-1.51	-1.47
	(2.15)	(2.07)	(2.19)	(1.97)	(1.91)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.09	-0.06	-0.17	-0.11	-0.12
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.07
N	280.00	276.00	280.00	276.00	276.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.5: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of Δ `Turnout` on Δ `Populist Participation`, Δ `Populist Representation`, Δ `New Populist Party`, Δ `Populist Vote Share`, and Δ `Populist Seat Share`. All models include country and 5-year period fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

A.4.2 Levels, Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-1.08				
	(1.19)				
Populist Representation		1.76			
		$(1.02)^+$			
New Populist Party			0.45		
			(1.26)		
Populist Vote Share				0.02	
				(0.04)	
Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.04)
ENPP	0.78	0.66	0.61	0.83	0.84
	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.53)	(0.53)
Unemployment	-0.37	-0.29	-0.35	-0.31	-0.31
	$(0.13)^*$	$(0.14)^*$	$(0.13)^*$	$(0.14)^*$	$(0.14)^*$
Trade Openness	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05
	$(0.03)^+$	$(0.02)^+$	(0.03)	$(0.02)^*$	$(0.02)^*$
Population	0.08	-0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Compulsory Voting	1.85	3.01	1.79	2.51	2.38
	(2.94)	(2.57)	(2.73)	(2.66)	(2.71)
PR	-4.00	-4.75	-4.54	-4.32	-4.22
	(4.02)	(4.08)	(4.32)	(4.26)	(4.19)
log(District Magnitude)	3.36	3.59	3.32	3.45	3.45
	$(1.09)^*$	$(1.16)^*$	$(1.14)^*$	$(1.17)^*$	$(1.14)^*$
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.09	-0.07	-0.13	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.55)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.58)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓
R^2	0.58	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.58
N	312.00	308.00	312.00	308.00	308.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.6: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

A.4.3 First differences, Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.93				
	(1.33)				
Δ Populist Representation		2.05			
		$(1.11)^+$			
Δ New Populist Party			0.03		
			(1.00)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				-0.04	
				(0.05)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					-0.03
					(0.05)
Δ ENPP	-0.22	-0.37	-0.36	-0.33	-0.32
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Δ Unemployment	0.02	0.12	0.06	0.11	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	-0.05	-0.07	-0.14	-0.13	-0.12
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-1.87	-1.58	-2.65	-2.61	-2.59
	(3.10)	(3.52)	(3.38)	(3.14)	(3.15)
Δ PR	3.62	5.46	3.91	4.05	4.00
	(4.77)	(4.23)	(4.98)	(4.71)	(4.66)
d_tier1_avemag	0.24	0.10	0.15	0.14	0.14
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.26)
d_margin	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03
	$(0.03)^+$	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Δ Age of Democracy	0.49	0.37	0.49	0.39	0.39
	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Country /Year Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.17	0.17
N	280.00	276.00	280.00	276.00	276.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.7: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

A.4.4   Levels, Prais-Winsten Period Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-0.13				
	(0.77)				
Populist Representation		1.75			
		$(0.75)^*$			
New Populist Party			1.07		
			(0.74)		
Populist Vote Share				0.02	
				(0.04)	
Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.03)
ENPP	0.18	0.19	0.06	0.30	0.29
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Unemployment	-0.17	-0.10	-0.18	-0.10	-0.11
	$(0.10)^+$	(0.10)	$(0.10)^+$	(0.10)	(0.10)
Trade Openness	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Population	-0.18	-0.26	-0.21	-0.22	-0.23
	(0.12)	$(0.11)^*$	$(0.11)^+$	$(0.11)^*$	$(0.11)^*$
PR	-2.39	-3.55	-2.80	-3.25	-3.22
	(2.97)	(2.84)	(2.79)	(2.86)	(2.87)
log(District Magnitude)	3.02	3.65	3.06	3.31	3.27
	$(0.88)^*$	$(0.92)^*$	$(0.87)^*$	$(0.92)^*$	$(0.91)^*$
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.18	0.25	0.14	0.27	0.28
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓
R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
N	312.00	308.00	312.00	308.00	308.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.8: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include period fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

A.4.5 First Differences, Prais-Winsten Period Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-0.85				
	(0.86)				
Δ Populist Representation		1.95			
		$(0.83)^*$			
Δ New Populist Party			0.40		
			(0.64)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				0.02	
				(0.04)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.03)
Δ ENPP	-0.64	-0.66	-0.75	-0.66	-0.66
	$(0.31)^*$	$(0.27)^*$	$(0.31)^*$	$(0.26)^*$	$(0.27)^*$
Δ Unemployment	0.03	0.11	0.04	0.11	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	-0.11	-0.18	-0.18	-0.18	-0.19
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-1.03	0.48	-1.35	-0.82	-0.80
	(2.06)	(2.32)	(2.13)	(2.12)	(2.10)
Δ PR	3.69	4.08	3.29	3.42	3.33
	(3.40)	(3.41)	(3.31)	(3.51)	(3.48)
Δ log(District Magnitude)	0.49	0.25	0.27	0.14	0.14
	(1.23)	(1.20)	(1.20)	(1.24)	(1.24)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.27	-0.23	-0.32	-0.20	-0.20
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09
N	280.00	276.00	280.00	276.00	276.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.9: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include period fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

A.4.6 Levels, Prais-Winsten Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-0.60				
	(0.79)				
Populist Representation		2.30			
		(0.72)*			
New Populist Party			0.73		
			(0.72)		
Populist Vote Share				0.03	
				(0.04)	
Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.03)
ENPP	0.44	0.40	0.35	0.59	0.59
	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)*	(0.28)*
Unemployment	-0.35	-0.23	-0.33	-0.26	-0.25
	(0.10)*	(0.10)*	(0.10)*	(0.10)*	(0.10)*
Trade Openness	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.02)+	(0.02)+	(0.02)+	(0.02)*	(0.02)*
Population	-0.05	-0.19	-0.07	-0.12	-0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)*	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Compulsory Voting	1.89	3.44	1.89	2.78	2.58
	(1.41)	(1.38)*	(1.41)	(1.36)*	(1.33)+
PR	-4.50	-5.43	-4.72	-5.04	-4.82
	(2.85)	(2.74)*	(2.76)+	(2.83)+	(2.82)+
log(District Magnitude)	3.43	3.46	3.33	3.49	3.47
	(0.97)*	(0.96)*	(0.95)*	(1.00)*	(1.00)*
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.02	0.07	-0.06	0.09	0.10
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓
R^2	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.99
N	312.00	308.00	312.00	308.00	308.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.10: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

A.4.7 First Differences, Prais-Winsten Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.29				
	(0.95)				
Δ Populist Representation		3.09			
		(0.83)*			
Δ New Populist Party			0.27		
			(0.65)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				0.01	
				(0.04)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.03)
Δ ENPP	-0.62	-0.70	-0.75	-0.58	-0.58
	$(0.32)^+$	(0.27)*	(0.31)*	(0.27)*	(0.27)*
Δ Unemployment	0.00	0.13	0.02	0.09	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-1.67	0.24	-2.20	-0.88	-0.84
	(2.03)	(2.18)	(2.13)	(2.09)	(2.09)
Δ PR	5.01	7.28	4.96	6.05	5.90
	(3.48)	(3.42)*	(3.43)	$(3.58)^+$	$(3.56)^+$
Δ log(District Magnitude)	0.28	-1.27	-0.15	-0.84	-0.81
	(1.32)	(1.23)	(1.28)	(1.38)	(1.36)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.09	-0.08	-0.19	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.22	0.28	0.22	0.22	0.22
N	280.00	276.00	280.00	276.00	276.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.11: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.2 in appendix*

14

A.4.8 All specifications summarized

Figure A.2: Coefficients for (Δ) `Populist Participation`, (Δ) `Populist Representation`, (Δ) `New Populist Party`, (Δ) `Populist Vote Share`, and (Δ) `Populist Seat Share` from fixed effects models in levels and first differences models (Δ). OLS estimation with period or year fixed effects and Prais-Winsten (PW) regressions with period or year fixed effects.

A.5 Figure 2: Populist parties in Western and Central and Eastern Europe

A.5.1 Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	0.11 (0.72)		6.75 $(1.96)^*$	
Δ Populist Representation		-0.28 (0.56)		7.63 $(1.46)^*$
ENPP	0.80 (0.89)		-0.52 (0.77)	
Unemployment	-0.22 (0.20)		-0.03 (0.36)	
Trade Openness	0.03 (0.02)		-0.06 (0.07)	
Population	-0.24 (0.17)		-1.90 (4.22)	
Compulsory Voting	3.45 $(1.94)^+$		0.00 (.)	
PR	-6.16 (5.24)		0.00 (.)	
log(District Magnitude)	3.94 $(1.14)^*$		0.22 (3.00)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.21 (0.58)		1.58 (1.26)	
Δ ENPP		-0.03 (0.37)		-1.59 $(0.78)^+$
Δ Unemployment		0.24 (0.15)		0.21 (0.28)
Δ Trade Openness		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.09 (0.07)
Δ Population		-0.20 (0.17)		0.46 (4.10)
Δ Compulsory Voting		-0.80 (2.90)		0.00 (.)
Δ PR		6.37 (4.59)		0.00 (.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		-0.49 (1.83)		-1.95 (2.01)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.34 (0.34)		2.04 $(0.94)^+$
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.56	0.12	0.50	0.38
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+ \ p < 0.1, \ ^* \ p < 0.05$

Table A.12: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on (Δ)`Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.5.2 Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	0.74		5.19	
	(0.61)		(2.38)$^{+}$	
Δ Populist Representation		0.04		8.29
		(0.75)		(1.97)*
ENPP	0.77		0.46	
	(0.80)		(0.89)	
Unemployment	-0.23		-0.24	
	(0.17)		(0.25)	
Trade Openness	0.04		0.03	
	(0.03)$^{+}$		(0.09)	
Population	-0.03		-5.35	
	(0.20)		(5.54)	
Compulsory Voting	3.69		0.00	
	(2.44)		(.)	
PR	-6.80		0.00	
	(4.18)		(.)	
log(District Magnitude)	3.93		6.69	
	(1.01)*		(7.55)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.13		1.08	
	(0.55)		(1.76)	
Δ ENPP		0.09		-0.26
		(0.47)		(0.62)
Δ Unemployment		0.20		0.28
		(0.13)		(0.17)
Δ Trade Openness		0.00		-0.16
		(0.01)		(0.08)$^{+}$
Δ Population		-0.18		0.22
		(0.15)		(4.50)
Δ Compulsory Voting		-2.01		0.00
		(2.08)		(.)
Δ PR		5.63		0.00
		(5.04)		(.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		-0.03		2.61
		(2.30)		(2.86)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.46		1.66
		(0.42)		(1.64)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.67	0.31	0.68	0.61
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.13: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4) including year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.5.3   Prais-Winsten: Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	0.23 (0.73)		6.60 $(1.74)^*$	
Δ Populist Representation		-0.43 (0.61)		7.28 $(1.31)^*$
ENPP	0.50 (0.32)		-0.98 (0.70)	
Unemployment	0.01 (0.10)		-0.10 (0.24)	
Trade Openness	-0.00 (0.01)		-0.07 (0.05)	
Population	-0.33 $(0.11)^*$		-0.43 (3.43)	
Compulsory Voting	3.31 $(1.51)^*$		0.00 (.)	
PR	-4.70 (3.14)		82.56 $(18.22)^*$	
log(District Magnitude)	3.15 $(0.87)^*$		1.01 (2.73)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.07 (0.30)		1.52 (1.03)	
Δ ENPP		-0.26 (0.28)		-1.39 $(0.51)^*$
Δ Unemployment		0.27 $(0.09)^*$		0.16 (0.15)
Δ Trade Openness		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.08 (0.05)
Δ Population		-0.26 (0.17)		-0.28 (4.16)
Δ Compulsory Voting		-1.10 (2.04)		0.00 (.)
Δ PR		2.93 (3.14)		0.00 (.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		0.26 (1.04)		-1.32 (2.43)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.37 (0.24)		1.57 $(0.84)^+$
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.15	0.95	0.39
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.14: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with period fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.5.4 Prais-Winsten: Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	0.93 (0.79)		4.58 $(2.38)^+$	
Δ Populist Representation		0.42 (0.68)		8.87 $(1.71)^*$
ENPP	0.50 $(0.25)^*$		0.53 (0.73)	
Unemployment	-0.06 (0.10)		-0.30 (0.27)	
Trade Openness	0.03 $(0.01)^*$		0.07 (0.07)	
Population	-0.17 $(0.09)^+$		-4.74 (4.23)	
Compulsory Voting	3.86 $(1.18)^*$		0.00 (.)	
PR	-6.79 $(2.95)^*$		0.00 (.)	
log(District Magnitude)	3.08 $(0.95)^*$		5.52 (8.18)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.21 (0.31)		0.64 (1.02)	
Δ ENPP		-0.29 (0.29)		0.13 (0.69)
Δ Unemployment		0.28 $(0.10)^*$		0.16 (0.18)
Δ Trade Openness		0.00 (0.01)		-0.19 $(0.08)^*$
Δ Population		-0.13 (0.17)		-0.35 (3.65)
Δ Compulsory Voting		-0.71 (2.02)		0.00 (.)
Δ PR		6.29 $(3.15)^*$		0.00 (.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		-1.43 (1.28)		3.13 (3.87)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.58 $(0.24)^*$		1.50 (1.03)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.37	0.95	0.66
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+ p < 0.1$, $^* p < 0.05$

Table A.15: OLS Regressions of Turnout on Populist Party (models 1 and 3) and Δ Populist Representation (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.6 Figure 3: Left and right populist parties

A.6.1 Populist Representation: Left, Right or Both

A.6.1.1 Full sample

	N
None	312
Populist Representation (Both)	29
Populist Representation (Left)	42
Populist Representation (Right)	103

Table A.16: Frequency of only a left populist party, only a right populist party, both or none being represented in parliament in full sample

A.6.1.2 Western Europe

	N
None	238
Populist Representation (Both)	21
Populist Representation (Left)	40
Populist Representation (Right)	71

Table A.17: Frequency of only a left populist party, only a right populist party, both or none being represented in parliament in Western European sample

A.6.1.3 Central and Eastern Europe

	N
None	74
Populist Representation (Both)	8
Populist Representation (Left)	2
Populist Representation (Right)	32

Table A.18: Frequency of only a left populist party, only a right populist party, both or none being represented in parliament in Eastern European sample

A.6.2 Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	-1.76		4.77	
	(1.09)		(2.13)*	
Populist Representation (Right)	-0.14		3.93	
	(1.78)		(2.06)+	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-1.36		5.20
		(0.77)+		(3.66)
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-0.18		4.64
		(0.77)		(2.43)+
Controls / Country FE / Period FE	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓
R²	0.57	0.12	0.44	0.25
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.19: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only

A.6.3 Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	-0.81		6.57	
	(1.32)		(9.41)	
Populist Representation (Right)	0.05		4.12	
	(1.57)		(3.66)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		0.03		10.23
		(1.54)		(5.60)+
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		0.35		7.86
		(0.64)		(3.21)*
Controls / Country FE / Year FE	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓
R²	0.67	0.31	0.67	0.57
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.20: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4), including year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.6.4 Prais-Winsten: Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	-0.07		4.86	
	(1.31)		(3.53)	
Populist Representation (Right)	-0.09		3.42	
	(0.75)		$(2.07)^+$	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-0.62		6.46
		(1.37)		$(3.54)^+$
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-0.65		4.12
		(0.72)		$(2.39)^+$
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.15	0.95	0.30
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.21: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with period fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.6.5 Prais-Winsten: Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	0.96		9.32	
	(1.48)		(6.06)	
Populist Representation (Right)	0.02		3.55	
	(0.74)		(2.75)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		0.75		10.09
		(1.40)		$(5.22)^+$
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		0.34		6.64
		(0.76)		$(2.20)^*$
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.37	0.97	0.64
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.22: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with period fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.6.6   Figure 3 für Western Europe

Figure A.3: Coefficients for `Populist Representation (Left)`, `Populist Representation (Right)`, Δ `Populist Representation (Left)` and Δ `Populist Representation (Right)` estimated on Western European sample in four different model specifications: OLS estimation with period or year fixed effects and Prais-Winsten regressions with period or year fixed effects.

A.7 Robustness

A.7.1 Jackknife

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-0.47 (1.34)				
Populist Representation		1.68 (1.04)			
New Populist Party			0.51 (0.99)		
Populist Vote Share				0.02 (0.05)	
Populist Seat Share					0.02 (0.05)
ENPP	0.65 (0.78)	0.56 (0.77)	0.55 (0.79)	0.72 (0.76)	0.72 (0.76)
Unemployment	-0.30 (0.18)	-0.24 (0.21)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.25 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.21)
Trade Openness	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Population	-0.16 (0.38)	-0.23 (0.37)	-0.18 (0.37)	-0.20 (0.35)	-0.20 (0.35)
Compulsory Voting	3.02 (3.65)	3.78 (3.80)	3.03 (3.23)	3.31 (3.57)	3.29 (3.60)
PR	-4.85 (10.34)	-5.64 (10.58)	-5.09 (10.67)	-5.21 (10.56)	-5.20 (10.45)
log(District Magnitude)	3.69 (1.86)$^{+}$	3.91 (1.90)*	3.67 (1.86)$^{+}$	3.73 (1.94)$^{+}$	3.72 (1.94)$^{+}$
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.30 (0.61)	0.34 (0.61)	0.29 (0.61)	0.34 (0.60)	0.36 (0.61)
Country / Period Fixed Effects					
R^2	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.47
N	312.00	308.00	312.00	308.00	308.00

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.23: Replication of models in Table 1 in the manuscript using jackknifed standard errors: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Participation`, `Populist Representation`, `New Populist Party`, `Populist Vote Share`, and `Populist Seat Share`. All models include country and 5-year period fixed effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	0.11 (0.87)		6.75 (3.09)$^+$	
Δ Populist Representation		-0.28 (0.71)		7.63 (1.86)*
ENPP	0.80 (1.16)		-0.52 (1.01)	
Unemployment	-0.22 (0.32)		-0.03 (0.57)	
Trade Openness	0.03 (0.03)		-0.06 (0.11)	
Population	-0.24 (0.29)		-1.90 (5.23)	
Compulsory Voting	3.45 (3.27)		0.00 (.)	
PR	-6.16 (11.33)		0.00 (.)	
log(District Magnitude)	3.94 (1.77)*		0.22 (8.44)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.21 (0.66)		1.58 (1.63)	
Δ ENPP		-0.03 (0.52)		-1.59 (0.80)$^+$
Δ Unemployment		0.24 (0.18)		0.21 (0.36)
Δ Trade Openness		-0.01 (0.02)		-0.09 (0.09)
Δ Population		-0.20 (0.52)		0.46 (5.44)
Δ Compulsory Voting		-0.80 (7.88)		0.00 (.)
Δ PR		6.37 (13.23)		0.00 (.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		-0.49 (4.77)		-1.95 (7.30)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.34 (0.34)		2.04 (1.09)$^+$
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.56	0.12	0.50	0.38
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.24: Replication of models in Table A.12 in the appendix using jackknifed standard errors: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on (Δ)`Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	-1.76		4.77	
	(1.71)		(4.44)	
Populist Representation (Right)	-0.14		3.93	
	(2.43)		(3.97)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-1.36		5.20
		(0.92)		(5.72)
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-0.18		4.64
		(0.92)		(3.53)
Controls / Country FE / Period FE	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓
R^2	0.57	0.12	0.44	0.25
N	243.00	222.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.25: Replication of models in Table A.19 in the appendix using jackknifed standard errors: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only

A.7.2 Sensitivity analysis: Eastern Europe

Country	Δ Populist Representation	Populist Representation
Bulgaria	7.04*	5.35$^+$
Croatia	7.15*	6.31*
Czech Republic	7.7*	7.33*
Estonia	7.81*	6.75*
Hungary	7.54*	6.83*
Latvia	6.97*	6.75*
Lithuania	7.36*	5.72*
Poland	9.07*	9.2*
Romania	8.05*	7.28*
Slovakia	7.84*	7.42*
Slovenia	7.01*	6.19*

Table A.26: Replicaton of models in Table (Eastern European sample). Coefficients estimated for `Populist Representation` and Δ `Populist Representation` when omitting the named country

Country	Populist Representation (Left)	Populist Representation (Right)	Δ Populist Representation (Left)	Δ Populist Representation (Right)
Bulgaria	5.19*	2.35	4.95	
Croatia	5.01	3.04	0.43	5.3 [+]
Czech Republic	4.67 [+]	3.86 [+]	5.39	3.49
Estonia	4.18	3.97 [+]	4.97	4.94 [+]
Hungary	3.63	3.52	4.89	3.24
Latvia	1.9	3.76	3.22	4.49
Lithuania	5.78*	3.03 [+]	6.1	4.08 [+]
Poland	5.77 [+]	7.34*	4.52	7.52*
Romania	7*	4.36*	6.59	5 [+]
Slovakia	2.6	5.08 [+]	7.45*	4.79
Slovenia	5.1*	4.15 [+]	6.34	4.74 [+]

Table A.27: Replicaton of models in Table (Eastern European sample). Coefficients estimated for `Populist Representation (Left)`, `Populist Representation (Left)`, Δ `Populist Representation (Left)` and Δ `Populist Representation (Right)` when omitting the named country

A.8 Post 1990

A.8.1 Table 1 and Figure 1

A.8.1.1 First differences, period fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.67				
	(1.97)				
Δ Populist Representation		2.01			
		(1.26)			
Δ New Populist Party			-0.21		
			(0.97)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				-0.02	
				(0.05)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					-0.02
					(0.05)
Δ ENPP	-0.64	-0.74	-0.72	-0.72	-0.71
	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.59)
Δ Unemployment	0.04	0.13	0.07	0.11	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	-0.07	-0.16	-0.15	-0.17	-0.17
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-2.19	-3.74	-2.60	-1.93	-1.85
	(3.51)	(3.68)	(3.60)	(3.35)	(3.30)
Δ PR	-4.36	-0.80	-5.35	-5.54	-5.72
	(8.91)	(8.34)	(8.11)	(7.76)	(7.58)
d_tier1_avemag	0.37	0.26	0.33	0.32	0.33
	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)
d_margin	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Δ Age of Democracy	0.39	0.32	0.45	0.34	0.33
	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.05
N	191.00	189.00	191.00	189.00	189.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.28: OLS Regressions of Δ Turnout on Δ Populist Participation, Δ Populist Representation, Δ New Populist Party, Δ Populist Vote Share, and Δ Populist Seat Share. All models include country and 5-year period fixed effects. Sample of observations from 1990 onwards.

A.8.1.2 Levels, Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-1.46				
	(1.77)				
Populist Representation		2.53			
		$(1.46)^+$			
New Populist Party			0.99		
			(1.63)		
Populist Vote Share				0.02	
				(0.05)	
Populist Seat Share					0.00
					(0.05)
ENPP	0.54	0.52	0.36	0.63	0.62
	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.46)
Unemployment	-0.50	-0.44	-0.50	-0.45	-0.45
	$(0.13)^*$	$(0.15)^*$	$(0.12)^*$	$(0.14)^*$	$(0.14)^*$
Trade Openness	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	$(0.02)^+$	(0.03)	$(0.02)^*$	$(0.03)^*$
Population	0.84	0.52	0.75	0.61	0.60
	$(0.41)^*$	(0.34)	$(0.38)^+$	$(0.34)^+$	(0.35)
Compulsory Voting	-3.32	-1.53	-3.41	-1.65	-1.85
	(3.98)	(4.10)	(4.40)	(3.95)	(3.82)
PR	-6.03	-3.39	-7.22	-5.15	-5.27
	(6.29)	(5.73)	(6.21)	(6.11)	(5.92)
log(District Magnitude)	2.67	1.80	2.53	2.26	2.41
	(2.07)	(1.92)	(2.12)	(2.04)	(1.99)
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.24	-0.04	-0.29	-0.09	-0.10
	(0.71)	(0.73)	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.74)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓
R^2	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.46	0.45
N	205.00	203.00	205.00	203.00	203.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.29: Replication of models in Table A.28: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.4 in manuscript. Sample of observations from 1990 onwards.*

A.8.1.3 First differences, Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.85				
	(1.93)				
Δ Populist Representation		2.48			
		(1.31)[+]			
Δ New Populist Party			0.19		
			(1.14)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				-0.04	
				(0.04)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					-0.03
					(0.04)
Δ ENPP	-0.50	-0.57	-0.64	-0.50	-0.48
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.60)
Δ Unemployment	0.02	0.13	0.06	0.09	0.09
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	0.07	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-3.52	-5.72	-4.26	-4.40	-4.39
	(3.35)	(3.41)	(3.51)	(3.35)	(3.35)
Δ PR	5.75	9.95	5.13	4.92	4.86
	(9.94)	(8.46)	(9.64)	(8.20)	(8.07)
Δ log(District Magnitude)	-0.11	-1.27	-0.58	-0.34	-0.31
	(3.47)	(2.96)	(3.45)	(2.81)	(2.74)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.27	0.41	0.13	0.24	0.24
	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.11
N	191.00	189.00	191.00	189.00	189.00

Standard errors in parentheses
[+] $p < 0.1$, [*] $p < 0.05$

Table A.30: Replication of models in Table A.28: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.4 in manuscript. Sample of observations from 1990 onwards*

A.8.1.4   Levels, Prais-Winsten Period Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-0.82				
	(1.22)				
Populist Representation		2.88			
		(0.99)*			
New Populist Party			1.89		
			(0.95)*		
Populist Vote Share				0.02	
				(0.04)	
Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.04)
ENPP	-0.21	-0.24	-0.41	-0.10	-0.11
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Unemployment	-0.32	-0.20	-0.31	-0.21	-0.21
	$(0.11)^*$	$(0.11)^+$	$(0.11)^*$	$(0.11)^+$	$(0.11)^+$
Trade Openness	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Population	0.61	0.26	0.56	0.36	0.35
	$(0.29)^*$	(0.25)	$(0.27)^*$	(0.26)	(0.26)
Compulsory Voting	5.23	6.24	5.93	5.37	5.21
	$(2.51)^*$	$(3.02)^*$	$(2.92)^*$	$(2.56)^*$	$(2.49)^*$
PR	-11.20	-9.06	-11.75	-10.09	-9.95
	$(4.27)^*$	$(4.14)^*$	$(3.94)^*$	$(4.27)^*$	$(4.25)^*$
log(District Magnitude)	3.28	2.31	2.97	2.89	2.90
	$(1.56)^*$	(1.46)	$(1.36)^*$	$(1.55)^+$	$(1.54)^+$
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.32	0.46	0.23	0.46	0.47
	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓
R^2	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.99
N	205.00	203.00	205.00	203.00	203.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.31: Replication of models in Table A.28: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include period fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.4 in manuscript*

A.8.1.5 First Differences, Prais-Winsten Period Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.05				
	(1.22)				
Δ Populist Representation		2.36			
		(0.99)*			
Δ New Populist Party			0.29		
			(0.76)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				0.02	
				(0.05)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.04)
Δ ENPP	-0.74	-0.79	-0.84	-0.76	-0.76
	(0.37)*	(0.33)*	(0.37)*	(0.33)*	(0.33)*
Δ Unemployment	-0.02	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.06
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	-0.06	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-0.75	-0.91	-0.95	-0.36	-0.19
	(3.89)	(5.12)	(3.98)	(4.10)	(4.02)
Δ PR	-2.55	-0.56	-2.83	-2.59	-2.72
	(4.86)	(5.52)	(4.65)	(5.08)	(4.94)
Δ log(District Magnitude)	1.52	1.07	1.24	1.12	1.10
	(1.54)	(1.47)	(1.48)	(1.55)	(1.54)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.06	-0.06	-0.14	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.06
N	191.00	189.00	191.00	189.00	189.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.32: Replication of models in Table A.28: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include period fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.4 in manuscript*

A.8.1.6 Levels, Prais-Winsten Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Populist Participation	-0.95				
	(1.12)				
Populist Representation		3.23			
		(0.96)*			
New Populist Party			1.31		
			(0.84)		
Populist Vote Share				0.05	
				(0.04)	
Populist Seat Share					0.02
					(0.03)
ENPP	0.41	0.28	0.27	0.44	0.45
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Unemployment	-0.54	-0.46	-0.54	-0.48	-0.48
	(0.10)*	(0.11)*	(0.10)*	(0.11)*	(0.11)*
Trade Openness	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.02)*	(0.02)*	(0.02)*	(0.02)*	(0.02)*
Population	0.91	0.58	0.84	0.70	0.66
	(0.28)*	(0.23)*	(0.27)*	(0.25)*	(0.25)*
Compulsory Voting	-2.08	0.31	-1.86	0.20	-0.12
	(3.04)	(3.09)	(3.24)	(3.15)	(3.05)
PR	-10.08	-6.72	-10.14	-9.79	-9.40
	(4.37)*	(4.08)+	(4.38)*	(4.31)*	(4.30)*
log(District Magnitude)	4.10	2.63	3.71	3.77	3.83
	(1.41)*	(1.40)+	(1.39)*	(1.44)*	(1.42)*
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.10	0.01	-0.20	0.07	0.11
	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.45)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✓/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.99
N	205.00	203.00	205.00	203.00	203.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.33: Replication of models in Table A.28: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.4 in manuscript*

A.8.1.7   First Differences, Prais-Winsten Year Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Populist Participation	-1.84				
	(1.31)				
Δ Populist Representation		3.66			
		(0.94)*			
Δ New Populist Party			0.12		
			(0.79)		
Δ Populist Vote Share				0.01	
				(0.04)	
Δ Populist Seat Share					0.01
					(0.04)
Δ ENPP	-0.74	-0.91	-0.89	-0.71	-0.71
	$(0.41)^+$	(0.35)*	(0.39)*	(0.35)*	(0.35)*
Δ Unemployment	-0.04	0.11	0.00	0.05	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Δ Trade Openness	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Δ Population	0.17	0.13	0.08	0.09	0.09
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Δ Compulsory Voting	-0.83	-3.47	-2.41	-1.53	-1.45
	(4.08)	(5.57)	(4.35)	(4.68)	(4.66)
Δ PR	0.07	6.73	0.84	2.25	2.22
	(4.94)	(5.87)	(4.71)	(5.36)	(5.31)
Δ log(District Magnitude)	1.23	-0.82	0.54	-0.02	-0.03
	(1.38)	(1.37)	(1.34)	(1.52)	(1.50)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.13	0.09	-0.00	0.09	0.11
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.20	0.25	0.20	0.18	0.18
N	191.00	189.00	191.00	189.00	189.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.34: Replication of models in Table A.28: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 2) and `Populist Presence` (3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are regressions in levels including country and year fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 are regressions in first differences and include year fixed effects. *Coefficient estimates in first four rows reported in Figure A.4 in manuscript*

A.8.1.8   All specifications summarized

Figure A.4: Coefficients for (Δ) `Populist Participation`, (Δ) `Populist Representation`, (Δ) `New Populist Party`, (Δ) `Populist Vote Share`, and (Δ) `Populist Seat Share` from fixed effects models in levels and first differences models (Δ). OLS estimation with period or year fixed effects and Prais-Winsten (PW) regressions with period or year fixed effects.

## A.8.2 Figure 2: Populist parties in Western and Central and Eastern Europe

Figure A.5: Coefficients for `Populist Representation` and Δ `Populist Representation` estimated on Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Western European (WE) sub-samples in four different model specifications: OLS estimation with period or year fixed effects and Prais-Winsten regressions with period or year fixed effects.

A.8.2.1 Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	-0.22 (0.98)		6.75 (1.96)*	
Δ Populist Representation		-1.10 (0.47)*		7.63 (1.46)*
ENPP	-0.32 (0.76)		-0.52 (0.77)	
Unemployment	-0.32 (0.21)		-0.03 (0.36)	
Trade Openness	0.03 (0.02)		-0.06 (0.07)	
Population	0.09 (0.44)		-1.90 (4.22)	
Compulsory Voting	7.60 (2.20)*		0.00 (.)	
PR	-13.03 (4.14)*		0.00 (.)	
log(District Magnitude)	3.07 (1.51)$^+$		0.22 (3.00)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.14 (0.63)		1.58 (1.26)	
Δ ENPP		-0.11 (0.43)		-1.59 (0.78)$^+$
Δ Unemployment		0.15 (0.15)		0.21 (0.28)
Δ Trade Openness		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.09 (0.07)
Δ Population		-0.21 (0.15)		0.46 (4.10)
Δ Compulsory Voting		-0.38 (1.55)		0.00 (.)
Δ PR		-7.14 (2.38)*		0.00 (.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		2.99 (0.80)*		-1.95 (2.01)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.13 (0.48)		2.04 (0.94)$^+$
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.36	0.08	0.50	0.38
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
$^+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A.35: Replication of models in Table 1 : OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.2.2 Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	1.16		5.19	
	(1.17)		(2.38)	
Δ Populist Representation		-0.70		8.29
		(0.89)		(1.97)**
ENPP	0.05		0.46	
	(0.77)		(0.89)	
Unemployment	-0.47		-0.24	
	(0.16)**		(0.25)	
Trade Openness	0.06		0.03	
	(0.03)		(0.09)	
Population	0.30		-5.35	
	(0.39)		(5.54)	
Compulsory Voting	1.85		0.00	
	(4.67)		(.)	
PR	-9.28		0.00	
	(4.98)		(.)	
log(District Magnitude)	2.19		6.69	
	(1.84)		(7.55)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.53		1.08	
	(0.56)		(1.76)	
Δ ENPP		-0.06		-0.26
		(0.51)		(0.62)
Δ Unemployment		0.10		0.28
		(0.13)		(0.17)
Δ Trade Openness		0.01		-0.16
		(0.01)		(0.08)
Δ Population		-0.18		0.22
		(0.12)		(4.50)
Δ Compulsory Voting		0.38		0.00
		(1.54)		(.)
Δ PR		-6.14		0.00
		(2.05)**		(.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		2.84		2.61
		(0.84)**		(2.86)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.37		1.66
		(0.47)		(1.64)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.55	0.30	0.68	0.61
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.36: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4) including year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.2.3 Prais-Winsten: Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	-0.24		6.60	
	(1.05)		(1.74)***	
Δ Populist Representation		-1.20		7.28
		(0.69)		(1.31)***
ENPP	-0.32		-0.98	
	(0.45)		(0.70)	
Unemployment	-0.16		-0.10	
	(0.12)		(0.24)	
Trade Openness	0.01		-0.07	
	(0.02)		(0.05)	
Population	0.11		-0.43	
	(0.26)		(3.43)	
Compulsory Voting	7.72		0.00	
	(2.46)**		(.)	
PR	-9.45		82.56	
	(3.56)**		(18.22)***	
log(District Magnitude)	1.76		1.01	
	(1.27)		(2.73)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	0.22		1.52	
	(0.35)		(1.03)	
Δ ENPP		-0.31		-1.39
		(0.33)		(0.51)**
Δ Unemployment		0.22		0.16
		(0.10)*		(0.15)
Δ Trade Openness		-0.01		-0.08
		(0.01)		(0.05)
Δ Population		-0.18		-0.28
		(0.20)		(4.16)
Δ Compulsory Voting		0.47		0.00
		(3.38)		(.)
Δ PR		-5.64		0.00
		(3.85)		(.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		2.12		-1.32
		(1.12)		(2.43)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.15		1.57
		(0.26)		(0.84)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.13	0.95	0.39
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.37: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with period fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.2.4 Prais-Winsten: Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation	1.72		4.58	
	(1.17)		(2.38)	
Δ Populist Representation		-0.34		8.87
		(0.70)		(1.71)***
ENPP	-0.12		0.53	
	(0.47)		(0.73)	
Unemployment	-0.34		-0.30	
	(0.12)**		(0.27)	
Trade Openness	0.04		0.07	
	(0.02)*		(0.07)	
Population	0.32		-4.74	
	(0.26)		(4.23)	
Compulsory Voting	4.15		0.00	
	(2.52)		(.)	
PR	-12.25		0.00	
	(4.03)**		(.)	
log(District Magnitude)	2.74		5.52	
	(1.41)		(8.18)	
log(Electoral Competitiveness)	-0.66		0.64	
	(0.40)		(1.02)	
Δ ENPP		-0.51		0.13
		(0.33)		(0.69)
Δ Unemployment		0.20		0.16
		(0.10)*		(0.18)
Δ Trade Openness		-0.00		-0.19
		(0.01)		(0.08)*
Δ Population		-0.07		-0.35
		(0.18)		(3.65)
Δ Compulsory Voting		1.45		0.00
		(3.52)		(.)
Δ PR		-0.61		0.00
		(3.78)		(.)
Δ log(District Magnitude)		-0.02		3.13
		(1.33)		(3.87)
Δ log(Electoral Competitiveness)		-0.64		1.50
		(0.31)*		(1.03)
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	1.00	0.43	0.95	0.66
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.38: Replication of models in Table 1: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party` (models 1 and 3) and Δ `Populist Representation` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.3 Figure 3: Left and right populist parties

A.8.3.1 Populist Representation: Left, Right or Both

Full sample

	N
None	187
Populist Representation (Both)	27
Populist Representation (Left)	30
Populist Representation (Right)	93

Table A.39: Frequency of only a left populist party, only a right populist party, both or none being represented in parliament in full sample

Western Europe

	N
None	113
Populist Representation (Both)	19
Populist Representation (Left)	28
Populist Representation (Right)	61

Table A.40: Frequency of only a left populist party, only a right populist party, both or none being represented in parliament in Western European sample

Central and Eastern Europe

	N
None	74
Populist Representation (Both)	8
Populist Representation (Left)	2
Populist Representation (Right)	32

Table A.41: Frequency of only a left populist party, only a right populist party, both or none being represented in parliament in Eastern European sample

A.8.3.2 Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	-0.06		4.77	
	(0.96)		(2.13)*	
Populist Representation (Right)	-0.96		3.93	
	(1.92)		(2.06)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-1.35		5.20
		(0.78)		(3.66)
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-0.76		4.64
		(0.62)		(2.43)
Controls / Country FE / Period FE	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓
R^2	0.36	0.08	0.44	0.25
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.42: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4). Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.3.3 Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	1.49		6.57	
	(1.88)		(9.41)	
Populist Representation (Right)	-1.30		4.12	
	(1.71)		(3.66)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-0.08		10.23
		(1.59)		(5.60)
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-0.12		7.86
		(0.74)		(3.21)*
Controls / Country FE / Year FE	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓/ ✓	✓/ ✗/ ✓
R^2	0.55	0.29	0.67	0.57
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.43: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4), including year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.3.4 Prais-Winsten: Period Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	-0.03		4.86	
	(1.46)		(3.53)	
Populist Representation (Right)	-0.53		3.42	
	(0.96)		(2.07)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-1.14		6.46
		(1.21)		(3.54)
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-1.14		4.12
		(0.62)		(2.39)
Country / Period Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	0.99	0.13	0.95	0.30
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

Table A.44: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with period fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

A.8.3.5 Prais-Winsten: Year Fixed Effects

	(1) Turnout	(2) Δ Turnout	(3) Turnout	(4) Δ Turnout
Populist Representation (Left)	1.69		9.32	
	(1.66)		(6.06)	
Populist Representation (Right)	-0.22		3.55	
	(0.95)		(2.75)	
Δ Populist Representation (Left)		-0.20		10.09
		(1.09)		(5.22)
Δ Populist Representation (Right)		-0.14		6.64
		(0.69)		(2.20)[**]
Country / Year Fixed Effects	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓	✓/ ✓	✗/ ✓
R^2	1.00	0.42	0.97	0.64
N	138.00	135.00	65.00	54.00

Standard errors in parentheses
[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

Table A.45: OLS Regressions of `Turnout` on `Populist Party (Left)` and `Populist Party (Right)` (models 1 and 3) and `Populist Presence (Left)` and `Populist Presence (Right)` (2 and 4), using Prais-Winsten estimation with period fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on a sample of *Western European* countries only. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a sample of *Central and Eastern European* countries only.

Figure A.6: Coefficients for `Populist Representation (Left)`, `Populist Representation (Right)`, Δ `Populist Representation (Left)` and Δ `Populist Representation (Right)` estimated on Central and Eastern European sample in four different model specifications: OLS estimation with period or year fixed effects and Prais-Winsten regressions with period or year fixed effects.

A.8.3.7 Figure 3 for Western Europe

Figure A.7: Coefficients for `Populist Representation (Left)`, `Populist Representation (Right)`, Δ `Populist Representation (Left)` and Δ `Populist Representation (Right)` estimated on Western European sample in four different model specifications: OLS estimation with period or year fixed effects and Prais-Winsten regressions with period or year fixed effects.